TF 1-64 in Somalia

By Brian Brock
” Spencer Albin , Tom Savage , John Hansen , Capt Dave Dressel and myself (Brian Brock) were alerted and sent to support Task Force 1-64 (Heavy Mech) out of Fort Stewart. This was the response to the rangers being killed in Mogadishu. We arrived approximately 13 Oct 93. We stayed in the same hanger the rangers had previously stayed in. We then convoyed out of local mortar range and occupied a former frog missile site. We practiced with Navy air and very little with the AC-130s (there were some very strange looking characters to do this). Mostly what we did, was train everyone (!) we could in close air and AC-130 tactics. We did a lot of volunteer work with radios, armed escort, etc. There were several instances where we were fired upon and one where we were mortared, but no really close calls. Four of the five personnel recieved bronze stars; Savage had subsequently gotten out. We recieved these a great deal after we returned. I originally drafted packages for four achievement and one commendation. The squadron and group commanders changed this. I believe the real reason for the medals was that when we got there, there was no AFFOR in place. The JSOTF wanted nothing to do with conventional forces. We were it and we had to create everything from scratch. We did meet with some 10th Mountain fellas who said “hi, how are you?” and then told their amry counterparts that we were their replacements. When we came back to see them, we were told that the CAS POC for the op was a Capt Dressel. They couldn’t see our names. We asked where he could be found. The answer “oh, he’s around here somewhere” What this all meant, was that we were it for the whole thing. Our BALO was the highest ranking USAF official in the TACS/AAGS chain. We were shit on because we weren’t on the original Joint Rolls. In the end, we made it all work. And someone in the air force really appreciated it.”


General Loh, sends a nice letter back to Gen Scott saying that its a great idea “Based on the results of the working group and as force structure drawdowns become more clear, the manpower may become available to build and field TACPs for USASOCs operational units.” I.E. Stand-by, we are looking at it